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LITIGATING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN U.S. COURTS: 
CRITIQUING THE LAWFARE CRITIQUE 
William J. Aceves* 
The lawfare critique offers a provocative challenge to the use of law 
and legal process in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has been used 
to question the legitimacy of numerous lawsuits filed by individuals harmed 
in the conflict. The lawfare critique is misguided, however, because it fails 
to recognize that the purpose of any legal system is to offer a viable alterna-
tive to the use of force. In addition, the lawfare critique runs counter to the 
right to a remedy, a firmly established principle of international law. Legal 
fora should remain accessible to victims, who should have the right to seek 
redress for their injuries. The rule of law offers a powerful mechanism for 
ending violence. We should be wary of any efforts to limit its use. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Arab-Israeli conflict has lingered for decades. It has affected 
the political stability of the Middle East and implicated international rela-
tions throughout the world. The conflict has caused thousands of deaths and 
even more injuries, and the violence has affected lives far beyond the geo-
graphic borders of the Middle East. Countless efforts to resolve the conflict 
have met with limited success. 
In the face of such an intractable conflict, it is not surprising that 
victims would seek redress for their injuries in any conceivable forum. Few 
lawsuits, however, are filed in the country where the harms were inflicted. 
Rather, these lawsuits are often filed in other countries. Several factors have 
contributed to this phenomenon, including the diverse number of nationali-
ties affected by the conflict and the challenge of pursuing claims in the 
countries where the harms occurred.  
In fact, several civil lawsuits have been filed in U.S. courts by indi-
viduals who have been harmed in attacks linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
These lawsuits raise a number of claims, many of which are based on inter-
national human rights norms and, most notably, the prohibition against 
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extrajudicial killing. The plaintiffs are innocent civilians, caught in the repe-
titive cycle of violence that typifies the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some victims 
were specifically targeted. Others were unintentional victims, euphemisti-
cally designated as collateral damage. The defendants are often foreign gov-
ernments or government officials. Occasionally, nonstate actors are sued. 
This litigation has had mixed success; many of these lawsuits have been 
dismissed while others have resulted in successful judgments for the plain-
tiffs. A few of these successful lawsuits have even resulted in the receipt of 
monetary compensation by the plaintiffs.  
Some critics have referred to this litigation as ―lawfare,‖ which is 
defined as a ―strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve military objectives.‖1 Lawfare has also been de-
fined more generally as ―the use of law as a weapon of war.‖2 The lawfare 
critique has been applied to legal proceedings at both the international and 
national levels.3 
In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, most of the lawfare criti-
que has focused on litigation filed by Palestinian or Lebanese plaintiffs 
against Israeli government officials or related entities in U.S. courts.4 In 
Matar v. Dichter, for example, victims of a 2002 Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) aerial bombing in Gaza City filed a lawsuit against Avraham Dichter, 
who was the head of the Israeli Security Agency.5 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Dichter had authorized a targeted killing operation that killed or wounded 
numerous civilians.  The plaintiffs raised several claims, including war 
  
 1 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, March 18, 2003, 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/5772/lawfare_the_latest_in_asymmetries.html  
(discussing the increased use of legal tools as weapons of war). 
 2 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Val-
ues in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, 
Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20 
Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.   
 3 See, e.g., Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865 (2009); David 
B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb 23, 2007, at A11; Eric Talbot 
Jensen, The ICJ’s “Uganda Wall”: A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction and an Entry 
Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 241 (2007); W. Chadwick Austin & Antony 
Barone Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a 
Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 291 (2006); Gerald M. Stein-
berg, The UN, the ICJ and the Separation Barrier: War by Other Means, 38 ISR. L. REV. 331 
(2005); Jeremy Rabkin, Lawfare: The International Court of Justice Rules in Favor of Ter-
rorism, WALL ST. J. Sept. 17, 2004 at A14. 
 4 See, e.g., Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eiten Meyer, Legal Jihad: How Islamist Lawfare 
Tactics are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 395 (2009); ANNE 
HERZBERG, NGO ―LAWFARE‖ EXPLOITATION OF COURTS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 2 
(2008). The lawfare critique has also been raised with respect to lawsuits filed by Muslim or 
Arab groups against authors or politicians for speech-related activities. See Goldstein & 
Meyer, supra note 4, at 395–397. 
 5 Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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crimes, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, and wrongful death.  In Belhas v. Ya’alon, victims of 
the 1996 IDF bombing of the U.N. compound in Qana, Lebanon filed an 
action against Lt. General Moshe Ya‘alon, who was the head of IDF Army 
Intelligence.6 The plaintiffs alleged that Ya‘alon had command responsibili-
ty for the attack and was, therefore, responsible for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, extrajudicial killing, and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Finally, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., involved a 
lawsuit filed by relatives of several individuals, including a U.S. activist, 
who were killed by an IDF bulldozer that was demolishing Palestinian 
homes.  Unlike Matar and Belhas, this lawsuit was filed against a U.S. cor-
poration, Caterpillar Inc, which had sold the bulldozers to the IDF.7 Each of 
these lawsuits was dismissed, albeit, on different grounds. Both Matar and 
Belhas were dismissed on immunity grounds8 while Corrie was dismissed 
pursuant to the political question doctrine.9 
The lawfare critique argues that such lawsuits are often filed by par-
tisan groups or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for political or stra-
tegic purposes. Critics assert that plaintiffs do not expect to win when they 
file these lawsuits.10 Critics have also noted that these lawsuits fail to 
achieve their legal objective of providing redress for victims and that such 
litigation can, in fact, undermine human rights.11 Thus, ―rather than putting 
an ‗end to impunity‘ and ‗obtaining justice,‘ NGO lawfare makes the pro-
motion and enforcement of universal human rights even harder to 
achieve.‖12 
This essay makes three claims regarding the lawfare critique and its 
applicability to lawsuits involving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Part II asserts 
that the lawfare critique stands in opposition to the right to a remedy, which 
is a firmly established principle of international law. Part III suggests that 
the lawfare critique is too broad because it could be used to challenge a 
wide range of lawsuits, including lawsuits filed by victims of terrorism in 
U.S. courts. Finally, Part IV raises concerns about the limitations that the 
lawfare critique could pose for a democratic society founded on the rule of 
law. At its most extreme, the lawfare critique would preclude the use of law 
to resolve conflicts or restrict the role of lawyers in conflict resolution, a 
  
 6 Belhas v. Ya‘alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 7 Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 8 Matar, 563 F.3d at 15; Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1290. 
 9 Corrie, 503 F.3d at 984.  
 10 Herzberg, supra note 4, at 23. 
 11  See id.  
 12 Herzberg, supra note 4, at 40. 
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puzzling proposition. Regrettably, the U.S. Supreme Court recently sanc-
tioned this very outcome in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.13 
II.  CHALLENGING THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY 
The right to a remedy is now firmly established in international law.  
It is codified in numerous international instruments, from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).14 It is also recognized in regional human rights 
instruments. The right to a remedy is premised on a fundamental prin-
ciple—where there is a right, there must be a remedy. Access to justice 
through judicial proceedings is an integral component of the right to a re-
medy. The lawfare critique would undermine this important advancement in 
human rights by restricting the right of victims to seek redress for their inju-
ries.  
For example, the ICCPR requires States Parties to provide remedies 
for any violation of its provisions. These remedies include the right to bring 
a claim and to have that claim heard.  Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR requires 
States Parties ―[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as here-
in recognizes are violated shall have an effective remedy . . . .‖ Article 
2(3)(b) adds that States Parties must ―ensure that any person claiming such 
a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, ad-
ministrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State . . . .‖ Finally, Article 2(3)(c) 
requires States Parties ―[t]o ensure that the competent authorities shall en-
force such remedies when granted.‖ 
The Human Rights Committee was established by the ICCPR to of-
fer guidance on the interpretation and application of the treaty.  The Com-
mittee has indicated that Article 2(3) requires States Parties to investigate 
and adjudicate cases of suspected violations and to provide redress in cases 
of established violations.  Thus, the Committee has explained ―Article 2, 
paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals 
whose Covenant rights have been violated.  Without reparation to individu-
als whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an 
effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of Article 2, paragraph 3, 
  
 13 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 14 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 8, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) 
A, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI). 
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is not discharged.‖15 Significantly, the obligation to provide a remedy under 
the ICCPR is non-derogable, even in times of national emergency.16 
The right to a remedy is an established principle of customary inter-
national law.  This development was recognized by the U.N. General As-
sembly in 2005 when it adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Inter-
national Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Huma-
nitarian Law (Basic Principles).17 The Basic Principles acknowledge that the 
right to a remedy for victims of human rights abuses is found in numerous 
international instruments and customary international law.  Thus, the Basic 
Principles do not create new international responsibilities but reaffirm exist-
ing obligations.   
The Basic Principles recognize that the right to a remedy encom-
passes three distinct features for victims of gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law: 
―(a) equal and effective access to justice; (b) adequate, effective and prompt 
reparation for harm suffered; [and] (c) access to relevant information con-
cerning violations and reparation mechanisms.‖18 Access to justice is an 
important component.   
A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an 
effective judicial remedy as provided for under international law.  Other 
remedies available to the victim include access to administrative and other 
bodies, as well as mechanisms, modalities, and proceedings conducted in 
accordance with domestic law.  Obligations arising under international law 
to secure the right to access justice and fair and impartial proceedings shall 
be reflected in domestic laws.
19
 
Similarly, the U.N. Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity also em-
phasize the importance of redress for human rights abuses.20 Holding perpe-
trators of human rights abuses accountable punishes them for their actions.  
And, it serves as a deterrent against future abuses.  In addition, accountabili-
  
 15 Human Rights Committee, ―General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,‖ U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
(2004), at para. 16.   
 16 See Human Rights Committee, ―General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency,‖ U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), at para. 14. 
 17 G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
 18 Id. at para. 11. 
 19 Id. at para. 12 (emphasis added). 
 20 See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, ―Report of the Independent Expert to Update 
the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005). 
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ty affirms the rule of law. It clarifies the truth about past events, allowing 
both victims and society to better understand the underlying causes of 
abuse.  The right to a remedy is, thus, critical to the struggle against impuni-
ty. 
While offering an intriguing and provocative rhetorical challenge, 
the lawfare critique misses the mark because it fails to recognize that the 
central purpose of any legal system is to offer a viable alternative to the use 
of force and a mechanism for victims to seek redress for their injuries. Legal 
fora should remain accessible to victims, who should have the right to bring 
claims for redress. Even lawsuits that are ultimately dismissed can serve a 
purpose for victims, publicizing their plight, and forcing defendants to re-
spond. Thus, the lawfare critique stands in direct opposition to the right to a 
remedy.  
III.  IS THE LAWFARE CRITIQUE TOO BROAD? 
Lawfare has been defined as a ―strategy of using or misusing law as 
a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives.‖21 
While this critique has generally been used to challenge lawsuits filed 
against Israeli government officials or related entities in U.S. courts, it could 
be applied with equal force to lawsuits filed by victims of terrorism in U.S. 
courts. Indeed, several lawsuits have been filed against Hamas and the Pa-
lestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for their complicity in acts of terror-




In Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, for example, a U.S. 
citizen and his Israeli wife were killed in a terrorist attack in Israel by mem-
bers of the Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement, which was subsequently 
designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.24 In 
2000, the Ungar heirs and administrator of the Ungar estates brought a civil 
action pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) against several defen-
dants, including Hamas, the PLO, and the Palestinian Authority.25 The com-
plaint alleged various causes of action, including acts of international terror-
ism, wrongful death, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
  
 21 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra, at 1. 
 22 See, e.g., Knox v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 628 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Auth., 422 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2006); 
Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 23 See, e.g., Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Stern v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 24 Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001). 
 25 Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 82. 
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and negligent infliction of emotional distress.26 Several plaintiffs were dis-
missed because they were not U.S. nationals, a pre-requisite for litigation 
under the ATA.27 In addition, several defendants were dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. However, the court refused to dismiss the case for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, insufficiency of service of process, improper 
venue, or forum non conveniens. After the court rejected these defenses, the 
defendants refused to further participate in the litigation.28 Default judg-
ments were then entered against the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, 
with damages in excess of $116,400,000 for each defendant.29 Damages 
included lost earnings, pain and suffering of the decedent, mental anguish, 
loss of companionship, and loss of parental services.30 The First Circuit 
rejected the defendants‘ subsequent efforts to set aside the default judg-
ments on the grounds that defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity 
and that the case presented nonjusticiable political questions.31 Subsequent 
litigation has addressed the efforts of the plaintiffs to collect the judgment.32 
In Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a U.S. national, Alisa Flatow 
was killed by a suicide bombing in Israel.33 Palestine Islamic Jihad, an or-
ganization funded by the Iranian government, claimed responsibility for the 
attack.34 In 1997, Alisa Flatow‘s father brought a lawsuit against the Iranian 
government and several Iranian officials in the federal district court for the 
District of Columbia.35 The lawsuit was filed under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides the exclusive means for suing a 
foreign government in U.S. courts.36 The FSIA offers immunity to foreign 
governments but creates an exception for several enumerated acts, including 
  
 26 Id. at 84. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 91. 
 29 See Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 400 F. Supp. 2d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Estate 
of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Estate of Ungar v. 
Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.R.I. 2004); The Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman 
v. The Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.R.I. 2002). See generally Debra M. Strauss, 
Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings 
of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 679 (2005). 
 30 See generally Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 
232 (D.R.I. 2004) (describing the basis of the recovery entered against Hamas). 
 31 Ungar v. The Palestine Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 32 See, e.g., Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27384 (D.D.C. 
2006). 
 33 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 34 Id. at 8. 
 35 Id. at 7–10. 
 36 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2010). 
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acts of state-sponsored terrorism.37 The Flatow plaintiffs alleged that the 
Iranian government had provided financial assistance to Palestine Islamic 
Jihad and that Iran had been named a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. 
Department of State, thereby fulfilling the core requirements of the FSIA.38 
Although the Iranian government was served with process, it refused to 
participate in the proceedings and default was entered.39 On March 11, 
1998, the district court held that the plaintiffs had met the requirements of 
the FSIA and awarded them approximately $22.5 million in compensatory 
damages and $225 million in punitive damages.40 Initial efforts to satisfy the 
judgment by attaching Iranian government property in the United States 
were unsuccessful.41 In response, Congress adopted the Victims of Traffick-
ing and Violence Protection Act of 2002, which authorized the payment of 
certain FSIA judgments from the U.S. Treasury.42 Through this compensa-
tion scheme, the Flatow plaintiffs accepted partial payment from the U.S. 
Treasury in satisfaction of their judgments.43 They chose to collect compen-
satory damages from the Treasury and pursue their claims for punitive dam-
ages in U.S. courts.44 
  
 37 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2010). 
 38 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 39 Id. at 6. 
 40 Id. at 32. 
 41 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 1999); Flatow v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999). Subsequently, on October 28, 2000, the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, be-
came law, affording certain victims of terrorist acts an opportunity to recover funds from the 
United States to satisfy their outstanding judgments. One month later, on November 28, 
2000, Flatow applied for such funds, electing one-hundred percent recovery of the amount of 
compensatory damages plus post-judgment interest. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act § 2002(a)(1)(B). His application was approved, and on January 4, 2001, the 
Treasury Department transferred to Flatow more than twenty-six million dollars, 
representing the compensatory damages award and post-judgment interest on that portion of 
the judgment. As a condition of receiving funds from the United States, Flatow was required 
under § 2002(a)(2)(D) to relinquish ―all rights to execute against or attach property that is . . . 
subject to section 1610(f)(1)(A) of title 28, United States Code.‖ Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act § 2002(a)(2)(D). Subsequent litigation has ensued in his efforts to 
collect the remainder through the attachment of assets located in the United States. See, e.g., 
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 275 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 42 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 
2002, 114 Stat. 1464. 
 43 Michael L. Martinez & Stuart H. Newberger, Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism 
with Civil Lawsuits, VICTIM ADVOCATE 5, 7 (Spring/Summer 2002). 
 44 See generally Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 
28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1029 (2005); Ruthanne M. Deutsch, Suing State Sponsors of Terror-
ism Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 38 INT‘L LAW. 891 (2004). 
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Each of these lawsuits was filed in the context of the decades-long 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Damages were sought, not only to compensate the 
plaintiffs, but to deter similar acts in the future. Would the lawfare critique 
apply to these lawsuits? Was the Ungar family using law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve military objectives? Was the Flatow 
family using law as a weapon of war? There are certainly some Israeli plain-
tiffs who consider their U.S. lawsuits against Arab interests to support the 
global war on terror.45 If the lawfare critique is valid, it would apply with 
equal force to these lawsuits.46 
There is, of course, a simple distinction between the Matar-Belhas-
Caterpillar cases and the Ungar-Flatow line of cases. The Ungar-Flatow 
plaintiffs were suing ―Arab‖ defendants whereas the Matar-Belhas-
Caterpillar plaintiffs were suing ―Israeli‖ defendants. Another distinction 
concerns the outcome of the litigation. The Ungar-Flatow plaintiffs were 
successful whereas the Matar-Belhas-Caterpillar plaintiffs were not. But, 
should the legitimacy of the lawfare critique be decided by the nature of the 
parties or the outcome of the litigation? A human rights critique of these 
cases questions why the Ungar-Flatow plaintiffs were entitled to relief whe-
reas the Matar-Belhas-Caterpillar plaintiffs were not. 
IV.  EXTENDING THE LAWFARE CRITIQUE: HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW 
PROJECT 
Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the lawfare critique is the infe-
rence that law should not be used by victims to seek redress for their inju-
ries or that lawyers should not be allowed to counsel clients on their rights 
or on available forums to pursue their rights. And yet, this outcome was 
sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project.47 
In Holder, two U.S. citizens and six organizations filed a lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of the terrorism material support statute.48 
One of the organizations, the Humanitarian Law Project, had consultative 
  
 45 See, e.g., Yigal Sarna, Israelis Fight Terror Through U.S. Court System (July 18, 2010, 
7:10 PM) http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3921358,00.html (describing a lawsuit 
filed in federal court against al-Jazeera for complicity in attacks against Israelis during the 
2006 war in Lebanon and the comments of one Israeli plaintiff, who remarked, ―[t]his isn‘t 
about money. I want to make the world a better place.‖). 
 46 Cf. Noura Erakat, Litigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Politicization of U.S. Feder-
al Courtrooms, 2 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 27 (2009) (raising concerns about the 
politicized nature of human rights litigation in the United States and the inability of Palestin-
ians to achieve success in lawsuits filed against Israeli defendants).  
 47 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2010). 
 48 Id. 
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status with the United Nations.49 The remaining five organizations worked 
on behalf of promoting Tamil rights.50 The plaintiffs sought ―to provide 
support for the humanitarian and political activities of the PKK [Kurdistan 
Workers‘ Party] and the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] in the 
form of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and politi-
cal advocacy, . . . .‖51 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to pursue several 
activities, including training the PKK ―on how to use humanitarian and in-
ternational law to peacefully resolve disputes‖ and ―how to petition various 
representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.‖52 
At the time the lawsuit was filed, the material support statute pro-
vided ―[w]hoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.‖53 A 
companion statute defined material support or resources as ―currency or 
other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, 
false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other 
physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.‖54 The statute was 
subsequently amended to include ―expert advice or assistance‖ in the defini-
tion of material support or resources.55 
The plaintiffs raised two constitutional challenges against the ma-
terial support statute. First, they argued that the statute violated their First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association because it crimina-
lized their provision of material support to organizations without requiring a 
finding that they had a specific intent to further the unlawful activity of 
  
 49 See id. at 2713. 
 50 See id. at 2713–14. 
 51 Id. at 2714. The PKK and LTTE had been designated foreign terrorist organizations by 
the U.S. State Department.  
 52 Id. at 2716. 
 53 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 
111-203 and 111-240)), invalidated by Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dept., 
578 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 54 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 25, 2001) (amended Oct. 26, 
2001). 
 55 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2010 P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 
111-203 and 111-240)). 
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these organizations.56 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the statute was un-
constitutionally vague in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.57 
The lawsuit proceeded through the federal courts for several years, 
shuttling between the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.58 
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s decision to grant the 
plaintiffs partial relief on vagueness grounds.59 In response, the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. In its June 2010 decision, the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the material support statute as applied to the specific 
forms of support that the plaintiffs sought to provide.60 The Court denied 
that the statute prohibited the plaintiffs from speaking or writing ―freely 
about the PKK and LTTE, the governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, hu-
man rights, and international law.‖61 On these matters, the plaintiffs were 
free to act. Rather, the Court found that the statute prohibited the plaintiffs 
from providing these terrorist organizations with ―material support,‖ which 
covers ―a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordi-
nation with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organiza-
tions.‖62 
Under the Court‘s analysis, the plaintiffs could not train members of 
designated terrorist organizations on how to use humanitarian and interna-
tional law to peacefully resolve disputes.63 According to the Court, ―[a] for-
eign terrorist organization introduced to the structures of the international 
legal system might use the information to threaten, manipulate, and dis-
rupt.‖64 These groups could use peaceful negotiations as subterfuge, ―as a 
means of buying time to recover from short-term setbacks, lulling oppo-
nents into complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks.‖65 
The Court also found that the plaintiffs could not teach these groups how to 
petition international bodies such as the United Nations for relief because 
such speech ―teaches the organization how to acquire ‗relief.‘‖66 On this 
  
 56 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2714. 
 57 Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 534 (2009), consolidated with Hu-
manitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 534 (2009).  
 58 Id. at 921–24.  
 59 Id. at 929–30. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that the portions of the AEDPA relating to 
―training‖ and to the ―other specialized knowledge‖ portion of the ―expert advice or assis-
tance‖ element were vague. 
 60 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. (emphasis added). 
 63 Id. at 2720.  
 64 Id. at 2729. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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point, the Court viewed relief and money interchangeably.67 Accordingly, 
groups could redirect such international relief to fund terrorist activities. 
In making these determinations, the Court attached great weight to 
Congressional findings regarding the serious threat posed by international 
terrorism. ―One of those findings explicitly rejects the plaintiffs‘ contention 
that their support would not further the terrorist activities of the PKK and 
the LTTE: ‗Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so 
tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organiza-
tion facilitates that conduct.‘‖68 The Court also noted that any material sup-
port, even support meant to promote peaceful activities, could be used for 
other purposes or could free up valuable resources.69 Moreover, ―[i]t also 
importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy 
that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to 
raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.‖70 
In dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority‘s failure to accord 
First Amendment protection to the plaintiffs‘ purported activities: ―All the 
activities involve the communication and advocacy of political ideas and 
lawful means of achieving political ends.‖71 He also expressed concern with 
the majority‘s willingness to rely on generalized and speculative fears about 
the possible implications arising out of the plaintiffs‘ activities. Justice 
Breyer recognized the broader implications of the Court‘s opinion, which 
essentially criminalized efforts to promote the rule of law. 
What is one to say about these arguments—arguments that would deny 
First Amendment protection to the peaceful teaching of international hu-
man rights law on the ground that a little knowledge about ‗the interna-
tional legal system‘ is too dangerous a thing; that an opponent‘s subse-
quent willingness to negotiate might be faked, so let‘s not teach him how 
to try? What might be said of these claims by those who live, as we do, in 




A thorough critique of the Holder decision is beyond the scope of 
this essay. It seems clear, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court accepts the 
assertion that law can essentially be used as a weapon of war. Thus, the 
plaintiffs could not train a terrorist group on how to use international law to 
peacefully resolve disputes. In addition, the plaintiffs could not even teach 
  
 67 Id. at 2725–26, 2729. 
 68 Id. at 2724 (emphasis added in original). 
 69 Id. at 2725. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 2732 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. at 2738 (citation omitted). 
File: Aceves 2 Created on: 1/3/2011 4:59:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 7:57:00 PM 
2010] CRITIQUING THE LAWFARE CRITIQUE 325 
these groups how to petition international bodies for relief. According to the 
Court, such actions could aid a group in its military operations.73  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the face of an intractable conflict that has lasted for decades and 
cost thousands of lives, we should see the law as an ally rather than an ene-
my. And, we should view lawyers as promoters of peace and not weapons 
of war. Courts should remain accessible to victims of human rights abuses, 
and the success or failure of such lawsuits should not be used to measure 
their legitimacy. The rule of law offers a powerful mechanism for ending 
violence. We should be wary of any efforts to limit its use. 
 
  
 73 In contrast, the material support statute excludes medicine and religious materials from 
the definition of ―material support or resources.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)(2010). Presuma-
bly, such materials could also aid a group in its military operations. 
